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Despite many claims by high-ranking policy-makers and some scientists that climate 
change breeds violent conflict, the existing empirical literature has so far not been 
able to identify a systematic, causal relationship of this kind. This may either reflect 
de facto absence of such a relationship, or it may be the consequence of theoretical 
and methodological limitations of existing work. We revisit the climate–conflict issue 
along two lines. First, at the theoretical level we specify the mechanism through 
which climate change is likely to affect the risk of armed conflict. We focus on the 
causal chain linking climatic conditions, economic growth, and armed conflict, and 
also argue that the growth–conflict part of this chain is contingent on political system 
characteristics. Second, at the methodological level, we develop an approach that 
takes care of endogeneity problems in the climate–economy–conflict relationship. We 
test our theoretical argument on a global data set for 1950-2004. The results show that 
the climate change–conflict hypothesis rests on rather shaky empirical foundations: 
we do find some negative effects of climate change on economic growth, while 
stronger economic growth is associated with a lower probability of civil conflict. 
However, the climate change effect on growth is not robust to changes in climate 
indicators and samples. Our results also indicate that non-democratic countries are 
more likely to experience armed conflict when economic conditions deteriorate. Our 
results suggest that investing in climate-friendly economic growth and democracy can 
qualify as a no-regrets strategy. 
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The assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 
2001; 2007), the Stern Review (2006), and many issue-specific studies demonstrate 
that human activity is contributing in important ways to climatic changes, and that 
those changes have far reaching effects on plants, animals, ecosystems, and humanity 
now and in the future. Among a wide range of negative effects, climate change tends 
to exacerbate the scarcity of important natural resources, such as freshwater, may 
trigger mass population dislocations (migration) due to extreme weather events, 
desertification and rising sea-levels, and may thus also increase the risk of violent 
conflict within and between countries.  
The IPCC’s 3rd and 4th Assessment Reports (IPCC, 2001; 2007) as well as a recent 
study by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU 2008), for 
example, refer to a possible link between climate change and violent conflict. The 
AR4 report, for instance, notes that climate change may become a major contributing 
factor to conflicts in the future particularly those concerning resource scarcity.  
Recent scientific work seems to support such statements. Burke et al. (2009: 20670) 
conclude: 
 
We find strong historical linkages between civil war and temperature in Africa, with 
warmer years leading to significant increases in the likelihood of war. When 
combined with climate model projections of future temperature trends, this historical 
response to temperature suggests a roughly 54% increase in armed conflict incidence 
by 2030, or an additional 393,000 battle deaths if future wars are as deadly as recent 
wars. 
 
High-ranking policy-makers have, on many occasions, also warned that climate 
change may contribute to armed conflict. For instance, UN Secretary-General Kofi 
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Annan stated in 2006 that climate change is a ‘threat to peace and security’1; and his 
successor, Ban Ki-Moon, argued in 2007 that ‘The Darfur conflict began as an 
ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change.’2 US President Obama 
stated in 2009 that ‘The threat of climate change is serious, it is urgent and it is 
growing…The security and stability of each nation and all peoples – our prosperity, 
our health, our safety – are in jeopardy. And the time we have to reverse this tide is 
running out.’3  
In contrast to such quite unambiguous statements by some scientists and policy-
makers, even a cursory review of the existing scientific literature reveals that there is 
rather little consensus on the climate–conflict relationship (for critical reviews, see 
Buhaug, Gleditsch & Theisen, 2008; Salehyan, 2008; Nordas & Gleditsch, 2007; 
Gleditsch, 1998). A better understanding of whether or not, and if so under what 
conditions climatic changes contribute to violent conflict is very important not only 
for scientific reasons, but also because of its policy-implications. If climatic changes 
do indeed contribute to violent conflict, this is (or perhaps would be) of course a 
powerful argument in favor both of drastic cuts of emissions of greenhouse gases and 
providing climate adaptation support to vulnerable countries, which are often also the 
poorest ones. The recent Himalaya glaciers episode of the IPCC reminds us, however, 
that we need robust scientific evidence when advocating costly policies. In addition, a 
better understanding of pathways leading from climate change to conflict (to the 
extent they exist) can help in avoiding or reducing, through appropriate policies, 
conflict-promoting effects of climate change. 
We add to the existing literature on the climate–conflict relationship (e.g. Burke et al., 
2009; Buhaug, Gleditsch & Theisen, 2008; Theisen, 2008; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007; 
Hendrix & Glaser, 2007; Reuveny, 2007; Salehyan, 2008) in at least two ways. First, 
while most of the existing literature empirically tests the climate–conflict hypothesis 
in the form of a direct relationship, we submit that climatic changes are likely to affect 
the potential for violent conflict primarily via negative effects on economic growth. 
                                                
1  Secretary-General Kofi Annan Address to the UN Climate Change Conference. 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=495&ArticleID=5424&l=en  
2  A climate culprit in Darfur. The Washington Post. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/15/AR2007061501857.html) 




Hence our theoretical argument specifies the causal pathway leading from climate 
change through economic growth to civil conflict, and our empirical analysis is 
designed to test this two-step causal argument. Second, we submit that political 
system characteristics, and notably democracy, can mediate conflict-promoting effects 
of sluggish economic growth. By implication, we argue that democratic systems are 
likely to be better equipped for avoiding violent conflict when climatic changes 
reduce economic growth. 
The next section (section 2) reviews the relevant literature. We then develop the 
argument (section 3). In the fourth section we discuss the empirical approach, and 
then present the results in the subsequent section. Section 6 summarizes the findings 
and discusses their policy implications. 
Literature Review  
Climate change manifest itself with temperature increases4, changes in precipitation, 
sea level rise5, and the intensification of natural hazards, such as storms, floods, 
droughts, and landslides (IPCC, 2007). One major implication of global warming is 
greater scarcity and variability of renewable resources in many parts of the world 
(IPCC, 2001; 2007). With increasing concerns about such effects of climate change 
some scholars, commonly referred to as neo-Malthusians, posit that climate change is 
a security threat. For instance, Homer-Dixon suggests that environmental scarcity is at 
least in part responsible for some recent conflicts (e.g. violence in South Africa, 
insurgency in Assam, Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas) (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Percival 
& Homer-Dixon, 1998; Homer-Dixon & Blitt, 1998).  
Arguments of this kind (e.g. by Homer-Dixon, 1999) posit that impaired access to 
renewable resources increases frustration among the affected individuals and social 
groups. Such frustration, in turn, creates grievances against the state, weakens the 
state and civil society, and increases the opportunity for instigating an insurrection. 
Building on this hypothesis, neo-Malthusian arguments then focus on two interrelated 
processes that are expected to exacerbate resource scarcity and competition over the 
means to sustain livelihoods. First, increasing temperature, precipitation anomalies 
                                                
4  The IPCC AR4 (2007) lists best estimates of +1.8 to +4.00C by 2090-2099 relative to 1980-
1999. Global mean temperature has already increased by about 0.75 degrees over the past 100 years, 
with more warming in northern latitudes, and greater warming over land than over the oceans. 
5  The IPCC AR4 (2007) lists a global mean sea-level rise of between 0.18 and 0.59 meters by 
2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999. 
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and extreme weather aggravate processes of resource degradation that are already 
under way (e.g. WBGU, 2008; Kahl, 2006; Homer-Dixon & Blitt, 1998; Homer-
Dixon, 1999). Second, more extreme weather conditions and other climate change 
implications, such as rising sea levels, force people to migrate. Such migration, in 
turn, can lead to greater pressure on resources in destination areas and to increased 
resource competition there (e.g. WBGU, 2008; Reuveny, 2007; Barnett, 1999; 
Homer-Dixon, 1999).  
Other scholars, commonly referred to as cornucopians or resource optimists, do not 
share this pessimistic view. They acknowledge that environmental degradation may 
negatively affect human wellbeing. But they argue that humans can adapt to resource 
scarcity by using market mechanisms (pricing), technological innovation, and other 
means (Lomborg, 2001; Simon, 1998). Simon (1998) for instance notes that, although 
population growth can lead to shortages or increased economic burdens in the short 
run, the ability of society to respond to such circumstances by improvements in 
technology and efficiency usually outstrips the constraints imposed by an increasing 
population. 
The neo-Malthusian argument has been criticized for being overly complex and 
deterministic, and for ignoring important economic and socio-political factors (e.g. 
Gleditsch, 1998; de Soysa, 2002a,b; Barnett & Adger, 2007; Salehyan, 2008). Critics 
have argued that scarcity of renewable resources is just one of the factors in the 
overall relationship between climate change and conflict. Buhaug, Gleditsch & 
Theisen (2008: 20) note that ‘climate change may increase the risk of armed conflict 
only under certain conditions and in interaction with several socio-political factors’. 
They reject the idea that climate change has a direct effect on the likelihood of 
conflict and propose several causal pathways through which economic and political 
instability, social fragmentation, and migration could increase the probability of 
climate change leading to armed conflict.  
Qualitative case studies (e.g. Baechler et al., 1996) provide some, albeit anecdotal 
evidence that climate change induced environmental degradation (such as water 
scarcity, soil degradation, or deforestation) has contributed to conflict in some parts of 
the world (e.g. the Sahel region). But it remains unclear to what extent these case-
specific findings can be generalized. Large-N studies have, so far, not been able to 
provide conclusive evidence. One part of this variance in empirical evidence is 
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certainly due to the use of different measures of climate change and environmental 
degradation, data problems, and different sample sizes and time periods. Another part, 
we submit, is due to the fact that past research has focused on identification of a direct 
link between climatic conditions and conflict. Conditional effects that stem from key 
factors such as economic development and the political system characteristics may 
thus have been overlooked.  
Hauge & Ellingsen (1998) examine the effects of land degradation, freshwater 
scarcity, population density, and deforestation on intrastate conflict in the period 
1980-1992. They find that all these factors have direct, positive effects on the 
incidence of conflict. Raleigh & Urdal (2007), using geo-referenced data for the sub-
national level, study how factors presumably related to climate change, such as land 
degradation and freshwater availability, affected the likelihood of conflict in the 
period 1990-2004. They find that, whereas land degradation has a moderate to small 
effect on the incidence of conflict, local freshwater scarcity significantly increases the 
likelihood of conflict. This effect is stronger in low-income countries with higher 
population growth. Similarly, Theisen (2008) finds that only a high degree of land 
degradation increases the risk of intrastate conflict and concludes that ‘scarcity of 
natural resources has limited explanatory power in terms of civil violence’ (p. 810). 
Hendrix & Glaser (2007) examine the impact of both long-term implications of 
climate change (land degradation and freshwater resources per capita) and short-term 
climatic changes (inter-annual variability in rainfall) on civil conflict onset in Sub-
Saharan Africa in 1981-2002. They find that, while land degradation does not have 
any effect on the probability of conflict, local freshwater scarcity is positively 
associated with the likelihood of conflict. In addition, they report that positive 
changes in rainfall significantly decrease the conflict risk in the following year. 
Hendrix & Salehyan (2009) also investigate the effect of climate change, in particular 
rainfall and hydro-meteorological disasters (droughts and floods), on civil conflict as 
well as on civil unrest in Africa. They find that rainfall deviation increases the 
probability of civil conflict. They also observe, however, that droughts have no effect 
and floods even decrease the likelihood of conflict. Similarly, Theisen, Holtermann & 
Buhaug (2010) study the impact of climate change on the risk of civil conflict in 
Africa in the 1960-2004 period. They use geo-referenced data and several different 
drought measures, which they condition on various socio-political characteristics, 
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such as politically marginalized population. They find little evidence that drought 
affects the likelihood of conflict. In contrast, Burke et al. (2009) find that temperature 
increases have a significant, positive effect on the occurrence of intrastate conflict in 
Africa. The studies mentioned in this paragraph are among the very few that use 
rainfall, temperature and natural hazards data, thus avoiding endogeneity problems 
associated with using indicators such as land degradation (see below). However, they 
still test for a direct relationship between climatic change and conflict, even though 
their theoretical arguments appear to favor an indirect relationship.  
Zhang et al. (2007) hypothesize that climate change affects conflict through its effects 
on agricultural productivity. They examine the correlation among the components of 
the proposed pathway for the pre-industrialization period (1400-1900). Based on 
binary correlations, their findings suggest that changes in average temperature are 
strongly correlated with changes in agricultural production and the frequency of wars.  
With the exception of several of the studies mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, 
many studies have used environmental degradation (e.g. water scarcity, soil erosion, 
land degradation) to explain conflict. These factors are very likely to be endogenous 
to human activity, in particular to economic development and the political system, 
which affects economic performance. Consequently, the causal effect may not only 
run from climatic conditions to economic conditions and then to conflict, but also in 
the opposite direction. In addition, several studies have shown that poor economic 
conditions may increase the probability of intra- and interstate conflict (Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2004), and such conflict may in turn increase 
the probability of recessions and affect economic growth (Schaffer, 2007; Blomberg, 
Hess & Thacker, 2006; Koubi, 2005). This two-directional effect may indeed create a 
poverty-conflict trap. Miguel, Satyanath & Sergenti (2004), for example, in a study of 
41 African countries in 1981-1999, present evidence that negative deviations in 
annual precipitation (an instrumental variable for economic growth) substantially 
reduces national economic growth and thereby indirectly increases the probability of 
intrastate conflict. Hence it seems crucial not only to theoretically specify the exact 
pathway along which climate change is supposed to affect civil conflict but also to 
align the empirical analysis closely to the theoretical arguments. 
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Politically Moderated CEC (Climate Change–Economic Growth-
Conflict) Relationship 
In this paper we propose a politically moderated relationship between climatic 
conditions, economic performance, and conflict (CEC). Our theory builds on key 
findings of the scientific community: that climate change is indeed occurring, that 
human activity has clearly contributed to the problem, and that it has far reaching 
repercussions on ecosystems and humans alike. Nevertheless, we are not yet 
convinced that climate change directly increases the risk of armed conflict, though we 
readily agree that climate change has many other negative implications for what is 
commonly called human security (Adger, 2009).  
As discussed in the preceding section, the existing scientific evidence on a potential 
climate-conflict relationship is still inconclusive. We believe that the inconsistency of 
existing findings arises at least partly because the empirical literature focuses on a 
direct relationship between climate change and conflict, and because it pays 
insufficient attention to conditional effects and endogeneity.  
Our argument starts with the assumption that climate change manifestations per se are 
unlikely to trigger conflict either among states or among groups inside a state. 
However, given the empirical evidence discussed above we accept that changes in 
rainfall and temperature, coupled with volatile weather patterns swinging between 
extremes, have the capacity to reshape the productive landscape of entire regions and 
to exacerbate food, water, and energy scarcities, as envisaged in the traditional 
resource scarcity (neo-Malthusian) model. Consequently, we argue that climate 
change may, through its effects on economic growth, induce competition among 
groups inside a state. Hence it may thereby indirectly increase the likelihood of 
conflict. Violence, however, will occur only in states where the capacity for dealing 
with climate-induced economic deterioration and associated conflict potential is low. 
In particular, we submit that democratic institutions such as a constrained executive, a 
separation of power, a large number of veto players in public policy-making, and 
property rights collectively serve to strengthen the rule of law and thus mitigate 
conflict. The remainder of this section elaborates on the pathway through which 
climate change can, via its effects on economic conditions, lead to civil conflict. 
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Climate change and economic growth 
The IPCC reports, the Stern Review, and many other studies point out that climate 
change has important, and in most cases negative effects on ecosystems and humans. 
However, estimating the consequences of climate change for economic growth, the 
relationship we are interested in at this point in the argument, is very tricky for 
various reasons. Climate and weather impact on almost all human activities from 
leisure to agriculture to industrial production. But even when considering only a few 
activities, for example agriculture or industrial output, the estimation task remains 
quite daunting. The main reason is that the impact of climate change will vary with 
levels of economic development and political capacity of a country, with levels and 
types of climate change (more/less rain; high/lower temperature; more/less frequent 
and/or intense storms, etc.). In other words: although economic and political actors 
will of course respond to climatic conditions by developing and implementing 
adaptation strategies, their ability to do so depends critically on institutional, 
economic, and technological capabilities.  
The existing literature provides ample evidence that climate change affects economic 
output (GDP) (e.g. Mendelsohn et al., 1998; Mendelsohn, Dinar & Williams, 2006; 
Nordhaus & Boyer, 2000; Tol, 2002; Deschenes & Greenstone, 2007; Barrios, 
Bertinelli & Strobl, 2010). This also suggests that climate change should affect 
economic growth. If climate change affected only the level of economic output, for 
example by reducing agricultural yields when temperature rises (precipitation falls), 
this would imply that subsequent temperature decreases (precipitation increases) – 
due for example to stringent abatement of emissions – should return the GDP to its 
previous level. But this is not the case if climate change affects economic growth. The 
reasons are the following. First, economic growth will be lower even if GDP returns 
to its previous level because of forgone consumption and investment due to lower 
income during the period of higher temperature (lower precipitation). In addition, as 
long as countries spend some resources to adapt to climate change, they incur 
opportunity costs in terms of not spending these resources on R&D and capital 
investment. This has negative effects on economic growth. Moreover, given the 
shortness of the times series used in existing research on climate effects on economic 
conditions, even slightly persistent effects on the level of output will impact on the 
sample mean of growth. That is, using economic growth rates will also capture the 
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effects on GDP levels. But using the level of GDP instead of its growth rate may miss 
the effects on the growth rate. For these reasons we concentrate on climate change 
effects on economic growth. 
The empirical literature offers some evidence that climate change affects economic 
growth. For instance, Miguel, Satyanath & Sergenti (2004) find that rainfall growth 
increases economic growth in Africa. Dell, Jones & Olken (2008), using data on 
temperature and precipitation for a panel of 136 countries over the period 1950-2003, 
show that higher temperatures have large negative effects on growth, but only in poor 
countries, whereas precipitation has no effect. The authors also find that the estimated 
impact of temperature in poor countries is large – a 1o C temperature increase reduces 
economic growth by 1.09 percentage points. In summary, we postulate, as supported 
by the literature, that climate change should have important negative effects on 
economic growth. 
 
Economic growth and conflict  
Previous research has shown that reduced levels of domestic economic activity tend to 
create incentives for increased conflict.6 Drawing on this research, we posit that 
climate change, by reducing economic growth (that is, reducing the ability of the 
economy to grow), affects the utility of individuals and groups to engage in civil 
conflict. It does so in two ways.  
First, negative climatic conditions, via their negative effect on economic growth, can 
reduce resources available to the government (e.g. by reducing tax revenue). The 
government thus has fewer resources to “invest in people”, for instance to provide 
better nutrition, schooling, and on-the-job training that would lead to improved living 
conditions. It also has fewer resources to “provide for the people” in terms of 
sustaining peace through the maintenance of law and order – the latter, for instance, 
lowers the probability of rebel victory by increasing the cost of rebellion. 
Second, climate related phenomena such as lower precipitation, higher temperature, 
and extreme weather events lead to lower personal income from production and also 
                                                
6  Chassang & Padro-i-Miquel, 2010; Garfinkel & Skaperdas 2007; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; 
Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Skaperdas, 1992. See also Blattman & Miguel (2010) for a critical review of 
the literature. 
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decrease the opportunity for future employment. Consequently, the opportunity cost 
of rebellion decreases because the expected returns from peaceful employment, say 
farming, compared to joining criminal and insurgent groups are lower. In situations 
like these, when individuals expect to earn more from criminal or insurgent activity 
than from lawful and peaceful activity, predatory behavior becomes more likely. The 
latter implicates conditions in which each individual or group’s effort to increase its 
own welfare reduces the welfare of others and also increases the probability of mutual 
attacks (Jervis & Snyder, 1999). 
The argument that poverty breeds conflict and war is supported by several empirical 
studies (e.g. Hidalgo et al., 2010; Dube & Vargas, 2008; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006; 
Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). For example, Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) find that low economic growth, which is a proxy for foregone earnings, has 
considerable explanatory power in their intrastate conflict regression. They conclude 
that rapid economic growth reduces the risk of conflict. Dube and Vargas (2008) 
examine whether violent actions in Colombia in the 1994-2005 period are linked to 
low opportunity costs of agricultural labor, using crop prices as a proxy for such costs. 
They show that a drop in the price of coffee substantially increased the incidence and 
intensity of intrastate conflict in coffee-intensive areas. They attribute this result to the 
lowering of opportunity costs of joining a rebel movement (via depressed wages) in 
coffee growing areas. Hidalgo et al. (2010), using a panel data set with over 50,000 
municipality-year observations, show that land invasions by the rural poor in Brazil 
occur immediately after adverse economic shocks, which in the statistical analysis are 
instrumented by rainfall. Consequently, our argument that reduced economic growth 






Political regimes/institutions and conflict  
As discussed above, we expect the probability of violent conflict to increase when 
economic conditions deteriorate (whether due to climatic changes or for other 
reasons): individuals anticipate that their returns from labor diminish; and the ability 
of the government to provide goods and services for the people and to maintain order 
decays. This decreases the opportunity costs of engaging in political violence. We 
submit, however, that armed conflict is more likely to occur in states where existing 
institutions and mechanisms for conflict resolution cannot provide people with the 
assurance that climate change induced economic problems will be resolved without 
recourse to violence. Formal institutions that help to enforce commitments inter-
temporally can mitigate commitment problems in situations in which each individual 
or groups’ effort to increase its own wellbeing reduces the wellbeing of others.7 We 
submit that democratic institutions that ‘restrain the dark side of self-interest’8, such 
as a constrained executive and separation of powers, an independent judiciary and 
courts, as well as the rule of law and secure property rights collectively work to 
reduce the risk of conflict. Conversely, societies with weak government institutions 
and few checks and balances are likely to be more prone to armed conflict. This 
implies that autocratic countries are more likely to experience intrastate conflict than 
democratic countries. 
Studies on the relationship between political institutions and intrastate conflict have 
mostly focused on the effects of democracy and have thus far produced mixed results. 
Several studies find that democracy is not a good predictor of the probability of 
intrastate conflict (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Others (e.g. 
Hegre et al., 2001; Sambanis, 2001; Ellingsten, 2000; Reynal-Querol, 2002a,b) 
conclude that partly democratic countries (that is, semi-democracies, meaning 
regimes in the middle range of the democracy-autocracy Polity index) are more prone 
to intrastate conflict than full democracies and full autocracies. Elbadawi & Sambanis 
(2002) find that political instability (measured as regime change) increases the risk of 
intrastate conflict. But this effect diminishes at higher levels of democracy. Note, 
however, that these studies examine the direct effect of political institutions on 
                                                
7  See Powell (2006) on the commitment problem, and Jervis & Snyder (1999) on mutual fears 
and security. 
8  See Skaperdas, 2008, 1992. 
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intrastate conflict, whereas our study concentrates on the interaction effect of 
economic growth and democracy on intrastate conflict.  
Consequently, we argue that climate change may, through its effects on economic 
growth, induce competition among groups inside a state. Hence it may thereby 
indirectly increase the likelihood of conflict. Violence, however, will occur only in 
states where the capacity for dealing with climate-induced economic deterioration and 
associated conflict potential is low. In particular, we posit that democratic institutions 
such as a constrained executive, a separation of power, and a large number of veto 
players collectively serve to strengthen the rule of law and thus mitigate conflict. 
 
Methods and Data 
Most empirical studies on the poverty-conflict nexus do not adequately deal with the 
potential endogeneity of conflict to economic conditions, even though several studies 
show that conflict influences economic performance.9 The work by Blomberg, Hess 
& Thacker (2006) provides strong evidence that conflict and the state of the economy 
are not independent of each other. Using panel data for over 152 countries from 1950 
to 2000 they find evidence that recessions and poor economic performance increase 
the probability of intrastate and interstate conflict. They also show that conflict, in 
turn, increases the probability of recessions and lower economic growth. Many 
studies (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003) use lagged values of 
economic growth and per capita GDP, indicating thereby that the authors are aware of 
the endogeneity problem. Nonetheless, lagging these economic variables is not a fully 
convincing solution to the endogeneity problem since the anticipation of political 
instability and conflict can affect current investment behavior and thus living 
standards. Hence we opt for a two-stage least squares procedure.  
 
Two-stage least squares approach 
We test our argument on the climate change-economic growth-conflict relationship 
using panel data from all countries of the world in the time period 1950-2004. 
Potential endogeneity requires a system of equations rather than a single equation 
                                                




approach in order to properly test the politically moderated CEC relationship. Rather 
than using an instrumental variable approach merely as a technical solution, our 
theoretical considerations suggest that climate change may indirectly affect the 
probability of intrastate conflict via its effect on economic growth. For this reason we 
employ a two-stage procedure. While controlling for country characteristics we are 
less interested in (Xit), we use several indicators of precipitation and temperature 
change (ΔPreit; ΔTempit) to instrument per capita economic growth in the first stage of 
the model (subscript 1): 
growthit =  α1i + β1,0ΔPreit  + β1,1ΔTempit + c1Xit + d1year  + e1it (1) 
We then estimate the effect of instrumented income growth on intrastate conflict in 
the second-stage equation (subscript 2) and introduce an interaction term between 
predicted growth and a country’s political system: 
conflictit = α2i + γ2,0growthi,t-1 (predict) + γ2,1democracyi,t-1 + γ2,2growthi,t-1 
(predict)*democracyi,t-1 + c2Zit + d2,1 peaceyears + d2,2 peaceyears2 + d2,3 peaceyears3 
+ e2it (2) 
Equation (1) is estimated using the fixed effects vector decomposition (fevd) 
estimator by Plümper & Tröger (2007). This estimator allows us to include time 
invariant variables alongside country fixed effects. Furthermore, we use panel-
corrected standard errors (PCSE) to control for panel heteroskedasticity (Beck & 
Katz, 1995), a Prais-Winsten specification to correct for autocorrelation, and we 
include a time trend. 
Equation (2) is estimated using logit regression with bootstrapped standard errors. To 
model temporal dependence, time since the last conflict as well as it’s squared and 
cubic term (peaceyears, peaceyears2 and peaceyears3) are included in the model 
(Carter & Signorino, 2009). This approach acknowledges that the likelihood of 
intrastate conflict onset today depends strongly on conflict occurred in the years 
before and thus controls for time effects. The use of peaceyears, peaceyears2 and 
peaceyears3 (cubic time polynomial) instead of cubic splines (as proposed by Beck, 
Katz & Tucker, 1998) has the advantage of a more straightforward interpretation of 
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the baseline hazard, whereas the approximation of the baseline hazard is at least as 
good as with cubic splines (Carter & Signorino, 2009).10  
 
Variables and Data Sources 
Economic growth (growth): 
The dependent variable in the first equation is economic growth. We use data from 
the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers & Aten, 2006).  
 
Onset of Civil Conflict (conflict):  
We use data on civil conflict onset from the Onset of Armed Conflict Dataset, a joint 
project of the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, Uppsala University, and the 
Center for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo 
(Gleditsch et al., 2002; Strand, 2006). An armed civil conflict is defined in the 
Uppsala/PRIO database as a contested incompatibility that concerns government 
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which one is the 
government of the state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. We use the onset 
variable that specifies a nine-year intermittency threshold. This implies that for any 
new conflict onset to occur the country could not have had any conflict within the last 
nine years.  
This indicator of civil conflict obviously captures only a particular form of political 
violence, namely events in which the government is directly involved on one side and 
at least 25 persons are killed. Efforts to collect data on communal (non-state) violence 
and social unrest are currently in progress, but such data is not yet available for a 
large number of countries and a sufficiently long time-period. In other words, the 
chosen indicator does not capture all forms and levels of political violence, but it 
measures an important and severe form of political violence, which figures 
prominently in the debate on the climate-conflict nexus. 
 
                                                
10  Another possibility would be to use the estimator proposed by Maddala (1983), which is 
designed to test a two-equation system with a dichotomous endogneous variable (see also Keshk, 
2003). In difference to the approach described by Maddala (1983), we need to incorporate in the 
second equation the interaction effect between democracy and the predicted values for economic 
growth from the first equation. Doing so in the context of Maddala’s approach is, however, not 
straightforward, which is why we opted for the procedure described above. 
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Climate change (Precipitation, Temperature):  
We use the annual variation in precipitation and temperature as indicators of climate 
change to estimate the impact of economic growth on the probability of conflict onset. 
This approach has two advantages.  
First, it avoids an endogeneity problem that is plaguing much of the literature on the 
neo-Malthusian hypothesis. Many of the empirical studies discussed above use 
environmental degradation, such as water scarcity, soil erosion, and land degradation, 
as explanatory variables.11 These phenomena are, obviously, not exogenous to human 
activity. If we used such indicators in our analysis we would have to deal with 
endogeneity in both stages of the estimation, which would be a daunting task indeed. 
Because climate change is a global phenomenon that is largely beyond human control 
at the local level within the short to medium term, using changes in precipitation and 
temperature avoids the endogeneity problem.  
The second advantage derives from the fact that, geophysically, temperature and 
precipitation are quite directly linked to changes in greenhouse gas concentrations, 
whereas other environmental phenomena (e.g. reduced water availability, soil 
degradation) are consequences of human-induced and natural climatic changes as well 
as human activity directly impacting on natural resources. By using temperature and 
precipitation we avoid having to deal with a plethora of complex environmental, 
health and other implications of temperature and precipitation changes that then affect 
economic growth. In other words, our approach helps in avoiding statistical problems 
associated with endogeneity, and it helps at the conceptual level in setting up and 
testing a rather parsimonious model that is tightly connected to our theoretical 
argument. 
We use three different measures of precipitation and temperature variation and rely on 
two different data sources. First, we use the Standardized Precipitation Index, SPI 6. 
This is a standardized probability index that measures variation in precipitation. The 
SPI 6 indicates the monthly deviation from normal rainfall during the six preceding 
months. Negative values indicate a period of drought and positive values indicate wet 
                                                
11  This statement does not imply a criticism of that literature because many authors have not 
been interested in climate change implications per se, but rather in the security implications of 
environmental degradation. 
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conditions (McKee et al. 1993).12 Following Theisen, Holtermann & Buhaug (2010), 
we aggregate the monthly SPI 6 measures by creating a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if at least three consecutive months have an SPI smaller than -1, which 
corresponds to weather conditions equivalent to a moderate drought or worse 
(McKee, Doesken & Kleist ,1993), and 0 otherwise. 
We also use the yearly moving average both of precipitation and temperature. This 
variable captures the difference between the current year’s precipitation (temperature) 
level and the average of the previous 30 years. As a robustness check we also use the 
annual growth rate in precipitation (temperature)13 (see Table A.I and A.II in the 
Appendix). Our data sources are the Global Precipitation Climatology Centre 
(GPCC), CRUTEM3 (Brohan et al., 2006), and the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) 
(Mitchell, 2004).  
 
Political institutions (xpolity): 
Our indicator for democracy is based on the combined Polity score from the Polity IV 
dataset. Polity assigns scores to democracy according to three elements: 
competitiveness of executive recruitment (XRCOMP), openness of executive 
recruitment (XROPEN), and competitiveness of participation (PARCOMP). The 
competitiveness of participation element makes explicit reference to civil conflict. We 
thus use the xpolity data by Vreeland (2008), which excludes the participation 
dimension of the original polity IV data. The original data are from the POLITY IV 
project (Marshall & Jaggers, 2004).  
To capture the interaction effect between a country’s political institutions and 
predicted growth in the second equation, we introduce an interaction term between the 
two variables into our model. 
 
Control variables: 
GDP per capita and initial per capita income (log gdp/capita, GDP_initial):  
                                                
12  More precisely, the SPI is the number of standard deviations that the observed value would 
deviate from the long-term mean. 
13  That is (Precipitationit - Precipitationi,t-1)/ Precipitationi,t-1 and ((Temperatureit - Temperaturei,t-
1) / Temperaturei,t-1). This measure is used by Miguel et al. (2004). 
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Since income convergence plays a key role in all economic growth theories and is 
always included in empirical studies of economic growth, we use the initial real 
income to capture convergence factors. In addition, we include the lagged value of the 
log of GDP per capita to control for the stylized fact that poverty breeds conflict, that 
is, the hypothesis that civil conflict is observed mostly in poor countries. We use data 
from Gleditsch (2002), which is an updated version of the Penn World Tables. 
Population (log population, pop growth):  
We include population size and population growth because population is considered 
to be an important determinant of civil conflict (North, 1984; Homer-Dixon, 1994; 
Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). For example, North (1984) claims that a growing 
population creates an increasing demand for resources and concludes that states with 
high population growth and inadequate resources are more conflict prone. Fearon & 
Laitin (2003) also argue that a large population implies difficulties in controlling local 
level activity and increases the number of potential rebels that can be recruited by the 
insurgents. Homer-Dixon (1994)’s argument that population pressure coupled with 
resource scarcity leads to intrastate conflict is empirically supported by Urdal (2005). 
Urdal observes that high population growth in combination with scarcity of utilizable 
land increase the likelihood of civil conflict. Simon (1998), however, posits that as 
long as population growth stimulates advances in technology, the economic 
motivation for territorial expansion will diminish and wars driven by population 
growth may be less common in the future. We use data from Gleditsch (2002).  
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ethnic fractionalization): 
Although there is disagreement in the literature on the relationship between the 
heterogeneity of a country’s population and the country’s propensity for intrastate 
conflict (e.g. Fearon & Laitin 2003; Cederman & Girardin 2007), we account for the 
possibility that ethnolinguistic fractionalization affects the potential for civil conflict. 
Elbadawi & Sambanis (2002), for instance, find that socially diverse societies may be 
at somewhat higher risk of civil conflict, whereas Fearon & Laitin (2003) do not find 
a statistically significant relationship. However, Theisen, Holtermann & Buhaug 
(2010) find that climate change is more likely to cause conflict in areas dominated by 
politically marginalized ethnic groups than in areas of ethnic group dominance. We 
use data from Fearon & Laitin (2003). 
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Rough terrain (mountainous terrain):  
Fearon & Laitin (2003) argue that mountainous countries are likely to experience a 
higher risk of civil conflict because rebels find it easier to hide in mountains and 
forests. They find a statistically significant relationship between rough terrain and 
civil war onset, whereas a similar analysis by Collier & Hoeffler (2004) does not 
support this hypothesis. We control for this potential effect, measuring rough terrain 
by the estimated percentage of mountainous terrain and using data from Fearon & 
Laitin (2003). 
Oil exporting countries (oil):  
Proponents of the ‘resource curse’ argument claim that the geographically 
concentrated abundance of some specific, globally scarce and thus precious natural 
resources (e.g. oil, diamonds, coltan) contributes to civil conflict.14 They argue that 
income from exploiting such resources may be used to fund insurgent activity, and 
that distributing the rents from such resources can produce conflict. Empirical testing 
of this hypothesis has, thus far, produced mixed results. Some studies have found 
evidence supporting the resource curse claim (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Ross, 
2004; de Soysa, 2002a, b; Le Billion, 2001). Others, such as a study by 
Brunnschweiler & Bulte (2008), find that resource abundance tends to promote 
economic growth and decrease the risk of civil war. In respect to the economically 
most important non-renewable natural resource globally, namely oil, several authors 
have argued that civil conflict is more likely in oil producing countries. The reason is 
that ‘oil revenues raise the value of the “prize” of controlling state power’ and oil 
exporting countries tend to have weaker state apparatuses (Fearon & Laitin 2003: 81). 
To control for this possibility we include an indicator for countries in which oil 
constitutes more than one-third of export revenues. We use data from Fearon & Laitin 
(2003).  
Regional dummy variables and time trend:  
We include regional dummy variables, with Europe serving as the baseline category, 
to control for any regional variation in both economic growth and conflict. We also 
introduce a linear time trend in the model to explain economic growth. 
                                                
14  The neo-Malthusian and resource curse arguments are, in contrast to a common 
misconception, not in contradiction. The former concentrates largely on renewable natural resources, 
whereas the latter focuses on non-renewable natural resources. In the resource curse argument, conflict 
is fueled by the geographically concentrated (and not the general) abundance of a globally scarce 
resource that offers high economic profit margins for those who exploit it. 
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Descriptive statistics are shown in the Appendix. 
Results 
Table I reports the results from the regression of income growth on climate change 
and the control variables described above. It does so for two samples: all countries 
and African countries only.  
We conduct a separate analysis for Africa because much of the existing literature 
focuses on Africa (and often on Sub-Saharan Africa only). The reason for focusing on 
Africa is that agriculture is the most important sector in these economies and a high 
percentage of the population lives in rural areas. At the same time, water storage 
capacity (dams, reservoirs) and the percentage of irrigated land in Africa are the 
lowest in the world, which, in combination with low economic and state capacity, is 
likely to make these countries more vulnerable to changes in precipitation. African 
countries also experience more frequent civil conflict than other parts of the world. 
Hence they constitute critical cases. That is, if we cannot detect a climate change 
effect on civil conflict in Africa such an effect is, presumably, unlikely to exist in 
other parts of the world (e.g. Burke et al., 2009). We think that this justification 
sounds plausible, but also think that an explicit empirical test is better, notably 
because agriculture is also important in other regions of the world, for example in 
Asia and Latin America, and because climate change in other regions is also 
occurring. 
 
Table I in here 
 
The results show that the impact of climate change on economic growth depends on 
how we operationalize climate change and which sample we use. The SPI 6 index has 
no effect, neither in the global nor the African sample (models (1) and (2)). In 
contrast, the moving average-based measure of temperature has a statistically 
significant, negative coefficient in the African sample (column (4)) – meaning that 
higher temperatures are associated with less economic growth. Although this negative 
effect of temperature change on growth in African countries supports the theoretical 
expectation, the effect is not very robust (significant only at the 10% level). 
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Interestingly, neither democracy nor population growth have a statistically significant 
effect on economic growth. The estimated coefficients of the other explanatory 
variables are statistically significant (except for ethnic fractionalization in models (1) 
and (4)) and are very similar to those reported in the economic growth literature (e.g. 
Barro & Lee, 1994).  
Table II reports the results from the regression of civil conflict onset on the 
instrumented economic growth.  
 
Table II in here 
 
Because we use a multiplicative term of lagged predicted growth and lagged 
democracy, the main effect of interest in this regression is best understood by means 
of a graphical illustration. Figure 1 shows the coefficients of predicted (instrumented) 
economic growth on the likelihood of conflict onset at different values of the 
democracy variable. If the vertical lines, which show the confidence intervals of the 
respective point estimate, do not cross the zero line, the coefficient on predicted 
economic growth is significant for the respective value of the democracy variable. 
Figure 1 shows that predicted economic growth has a statistically significant effect on 
civil conflict onset in less democratic countries (notably those with a Polity score of 0 
or less), but not in democracies. Figure 2 confirms this result, using the moving 
average instead of the SPI 6 in the first equation. Hence the results for the second 
stage of the statistical model support our theoretical argument that economic growth 
has an effect on civil conflict primarily in non-democratic countries. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 in here 
 
As to the control variables, only population, the log of GDP per capita and oil have a 
consistent, positive, and statistically significant effect on conflict in the global sample. 
Ethnic fractionalization has a statistically significant, positive effect in model (1) 
only. Presumably due to the lower number of observations none of these variables has 




We have checked the robustness of our results using various other indicators of 
climate change (Tables A.I and A.II in the Appendix). Whereas other indicators of 
climate change have varying impacts on economic growth, most other results are 
similar to those shown in Tables I and II above. 
In addition, we have tested the robustness of our results by looking at the direct effect 
of climate change on conflict instead of using the predicted values of climate change 
on economic growth only. Although, our theoretical arguments suggest that the 
influence of climate change on civil conflict should run only through economic 
growth, our results could be biased if we did not control for a direct climate effect in 
the second equation while there was indeed a direct effect. However, since the results 
do not support a direct effect of climate change on conflict, which is in line with, for 
example, Theissen, Holtermann & Buhaug (2010), we are confident that our results 
on the indirect effect of climate change via economic growth on civil conflict are 
unbiased.  
The indicator of conflict used so far in our analysis includes all civil conflicts in 
which there are at least 25 battle related deaths. Another commonly used conflict 
threshold are 1000 battle related deaths. Tables A.V and A.VI in the Appendix show 
that the results do not change substantively if we rely on this more exclusive conflict 
measure. Only the indicator measuring whether more than one-third of a country’s 
export revenues come from oil looses statistical significance.  
Finally, we run our regression models on a sample including particularly poor 
countries, namely those defined as ‘the bottom billion’ by Collier (2007), using the 
same list of countries as Buhaug, Falck & Gleditsch (2010). The logic is that poorer 
countries are more vulnerable to climate change and should experience a greater risk 
of conflict due to lower capacity to adapt to negative effects of climate change on 
growth. Although we deal with the fact that the a priory vulnerability of a country to 
climatic changes varies using country fixed effects, we also address one of those 
vulnerability conditions by running robustness checks with two subsamples: Africa, 
and all poor countries. As in the main models presented above, we neither find a 
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statistically significant effect of the SPI, nor of the moving average-based measure of 
climate change on economic growth. 
Taken together, the results for the two stages of our model suggest that the climate 
change–conflict hypothesis rests on rather shaky empirical foundations. We do find 
some statistically significant, negative effects of climate change on economic growth, 
while stronger economic growth is associated with a lower probability of civil 
conflict. But the climate change effect on economic growth strongly depends on the 
particular climate indicator used, and on whether we include all countries or only 
African countries in the analysis. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the literature on the climate change–conflict nexus along 
two lines. First, it conceptualizes this nexus in terms of a two-stage process in which 
climatic changes affect the probability of armed conflict via climate effects on 
economic growth. In addition, we view the effect of economic growth on conflict as 
contingent on political system characteristics. Second, the paper develops an 
empirical testing strategy that takes into account endogeneity problems in this two-
stage process. 
Our results provide rather little support for the climate change–conflict hypothesis. By 
implication, it appears unlikely that climate change will reverse the downward trend 
in civil conflict within the past decade. Does this mean we should bury this 
hypothesis, and that policy-makers have nothing to learn from existing research on 
this issue? We submit that the answer to both parts of the question should be NO.  
To begin with: even if all existing and future research were to show that climatic 
changes do not increase the risk of civil conflict, there are plenty of other strong 
justifications associating climatic changes with other types of very serious climate 
effects on ecosystems and human security. In other words, even though climate-
induced risks of civil conflict could potentially provide a powerful justification for 
greater investment in mitigation and adaptation efforts, climate policy can easily be 
justified with other reasons. The recent problem with the IPCC’s poorly founded 
predictions concerning melting of the Himalaya glaciers should also serve as a 
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warning that justifications for costly policies should not be pushed without robust 
scientific support. 
We also submit that it would be premature to conclude from our results that climate 
change has no effect on economic growth and therefore, by implication, no effect on 
the risk of civil conflict. The enormous literature on the determinants of economic 
growth shows that variation in growth is very hard to explain as such. Hence it would 
have been surprising indeed if we had been able to identify a very strong impact of 
climatic changes on growth alongside the many other factors that affect growth – 
though we did of course find negative effects of some climate change indicators on 
growth. However, it seems likely that much bigger changes in temperature and 
precipitation, compared to those observed in our sample period, which are predicted 
for many parts of the world in the next decades, will make it harder for countries to 
adapt. If so, negative growth effects of climatic changes are likely to become more 
visible within the foreseeable future. 
In view of our results for the growth–conflict relationship and its contingency on 
democracy, one of the policy implications of our findings is that investing in measures 
that promote economic growth (preferably in a climate-friendly way), democracy, and 
non-violent conflict resolution can qualify as a no-regrets policy. Even if climatic 
changes ultimately turn out to have no conflict promoting effect, investing in such 
measures is likely to have a conflict reducing effect. And if climatic changes do turn 
out to have a conflict increasing effect, countries with greater economic capacity and 
democratic institutions are likely to have a superior capacity to avoid or escape the 
climate change–poverty–conflict trap. 
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Table I. Climate Change and Economic Growth 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 world, SPI africa, SPI world, gpcc ma africa, gpcc ma 
SPI -0.403 -0.590   
 (0.407) (0.880)   
temperature ma30   -0.203 -0.856 
   (0.189) (0.475)* 
precipitation ma30   0.000 0.002 
   (0.001) (0.002) 
xpolity, lagged -0.044 -0.026 -0.036 0.008 
 (0.029) (0.080) (0.033) (0.076) 
pop growth 13.096 28.714 15.965 48.524 
 (9.077) (29.063) (15.011) (53.879) 
log population, lagged -7.102 -6.456 -4.613 -4.933 
 (0.617)*** (2.667)** (0.690)*** (3.317) 
log gdp/capita, lagged -5.913 -5.843 -5.417 -5.579 
 (0.663)*** (1.165)*** (0.960)*** (1.967)*** 
trend 0.211 0.170 0.158 0.146 
 (0.021)*** (0.072)** (0.029)*** (0.103) 
oil 3.726 6.388 2.925 4.845 
 (0.385)*** (0.641)*** (0.574)*** (0.391)*** 
ethnic fractionalization -0.777 2.282 -2.237 -2.093 
 (0.483) (1.046)** (0.606)*** (1.313) 
mountainous terrain 0.601 1.680 0.265 1.471 
 (0.060)*** (0.123)*** (0.065)*** (0.105)*** 
GDP initial 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
North Africa -5.283  -5.570  
 (0.270)***  (0.182)***  
Sub Saharan Africa -17.514  -14.109  
 (0.263)***  (0.429)***  
East Asia -1.653  -2.165  
 (0.335)***  (0.151)***  
West Asia -4.309  -5.247  
 (0.340)***  (0.185)***  
Middle East -12.244  -9.662  
 (0.428)***  (0.333)***  
Latin America -10.402  -8.526  
 (0.123)***  (0.125)***  
North America 15.157  10.763  
 (0.277)***  (0.185)***  
η 0.954 0.943 0.986 0.959 
 (0.006)*** (0.031)*** (0.018)*** (0.051)*** 
Constant 115.984 88.334 90.542 76.499 
 (0.215)*** (0.491)*** (0.204)*** (0.498)*** 
Observations 5281 1599 5074 1464 
R2 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.10 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
 
Table II. Predicted Economic Growth and Civil Conflict 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 










-0.098 -0.200 -0.103 -0.148 
 (0.049)** (0.136) (0.062)* (0.121) 
xpolity, lagged -0.005 0.063 -0.004 0.066 
 (0.032) (0.054) (0.031) (0.056) 
polity*growth 0.017 -0.021 0.018 -0.013 
 (0.011) (0.041) (0.010)* (0.033) 
pop growth -4.986 14.027 -5.404 17.121 
 (7.784) (7.169)* (8.110) (12.058) 
log population, 
lagged 
0.225 0.065 0.223 0.066 
 (0.075)*** (0.162) (0.076)*** (0.182) 
log gdp/capita, 
lagged 
-0.433 -0.466 -0.464 -0.587 
 (0.182)** (0.420) (0.193)** (0.463) 
oil 0.630 0.431 0.653 0.482 
 (0.298)** (0.654) (0.336)* (0.611) 
ethnic 
fractionalization 
0.961 0.460 1.070 0.256 
 (0.443)** (0.756) (0.656) (0.658) 
mountainous terrain 0.074 0.216 0.045 0.203 
 (0.075) (0.132) (0.095) (0.164) 
GDP initial -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
North Africa 0.456  0.373  
 (0.541)  (0.575)  
Sub Saharan Africa -0.298  -0.494  
 (0.607)  (0.618)  
East Asia -0.466  -0.508  
 (0.422)  (0.495)  
West Asia 0.078  -0.017  
 (0.530)  (0.519)  
Middle East 0.113  0.086  
 (0.664)  (0.731)  
Latin America 0.349  0.334  
 (0.417)  (0.466)  
peace years -0.050 0.039 -0.042 0.055 
 (0.048) (0.131) (0.048) (0.119) 
peace years^2 0.004 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) 
peace years^3 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -2.722 -2.136 -2.368 -1.297 
 (1.580)* (3.206) (1.907) (3.944) 
Observations 5103 1582 4902 1450 
Log likelihood -518.19 -211.05 -498.83 -195.01 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.04 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Figure 1. Effects of predicted economic growth on civil conflict at different levels of 
democracy (SPI 6 in first stage of model) 
  
Figure 2. Effects of predicted economic growth on civil conflict at different levels of 






Table A.I. Climate change and economic growth 



















temp_miguel_GPCC -0.131 -19.572     
 (0.057)** (11.205)*     
preci_miguel_GPCC 1.068 0.907     
 (0.254)*** (0.563)     
temp_miguel_CRU   0.108 -17.257   
   (0.061)* (12.974)   
preci_miguel_CRU   1.899 1.144   
   (0.433)*** (0.930)   
temperature ma30     -0.469 -1.078 
     (0.219)** (0.661) 
precipitation ma30     0.000 0.002 
     (0.001) (0.002) 
xpolity, lagged -0.033 0.019 -0.067 -0.046 -0.068 -0.059 
 (0.034) (0.077) (0.031)** (0.093) (0.031)** (0.092) 
pop growth 16.001 47.676 18.301 31.131 18.757 31.647 
 (14.986) (53.216) (10.316)* (34.333) (10.217)* (34.411) 
log population, lagged -4.271 -5.576 -6.983 -5.168 -7.530 -5.071 
 (0.688)*** (3.166)* (0.632)*** (3.053)* (0.632)*** (3.124) 
log gdp/capita, lagged -5.476 -5.792 -6.207 -6.364 -6.242 -6.204 
 (0.967)*** (1.972)*** (0.730)*** (1.470)*** (0.723)*** (1.486)*** 
trend 0.150 0.154 0.218 0.127 0.235 0.137 
 (0.029)*** (0.101) (0.021)*** (0.089) (0.023)*** (0.090) 
oil 2.842 5.742 3.856 5.467 4.014 5.170 
 (0.586)*** (0.393)*** (0.459)*** (0.775)*** (0.450)*** (0.768)*** 
ethnic fractionalization -2.419 -1.746 -0.955 0.186 -0.818 0.145 
 (0.600)*** (1.297) (0.558)* (1.317) (0.545) (1.309) 
mountainous terrain 0.207 1.744 0.533 1.180 0.620 1.137 
 (0.064)*** (0.118)*** (0.069)*** (0.146)*** (0.069)*** (0.143)*** 
GDP initial 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** 
North Africa -5.858  -6.365  -6.093  
 (0.169)***  (0.212)***  (0.198)***  
Sub Saharan Africa -13.919  -18.352  -18.724  
 (0.431)***  (0.289)***  (0.293)***  
East Asia -2.313  -2.294  -2.160  
 (0.139)***  (0.378)***  (0.358)***  
West Asia -5.629  -5.359  -4.919  
 (0.181)***  (0.370)***  (0.378)***  
Middle East -9.446  -12.851  -13.229  
 (0.333)***  (0.529)***  (0.516)***  
Latin America -8.332  -10.893  -11.282  
 (0.101)***  (0.131)***  (0.131)***  
North America 10.214  15.020  15.984  
 (0.186)***  (0.324)***  (0.326)***  
η 0.995 0.959 0.968 0.953 0.956 0.952 
 (0.021)*** (0.047)*** (0.008)*** (0.038)*** (0.007)*** (0.039)*** 
Constant 88.173 82.606 117.734 82.847 122.564 81.030 
 (0.192)*** (0.494)*** (0.225)*** (0.654)*** (0.241)*** (0.643)*** 
Observations 5056 1453 4783 1456 4789 1456 
R2 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09 
Standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Table A.II. Predicted economic growth and civil conflict 
 
























-0.119 -0.155 -0.119 -0.193 -0.118 -0.190 
 (0.051)** (0.115) (0.055)** (0.137) (0.044)*** (0.129) 
xpolity, lagged 0.003 0.067 0.014 0.064 0.013 0.063 
 (0.033) (0.054) (0.035) (0.063) (0.037) (0.054) 
polity*growth 0.014 -0.013 0.009 -0.023 0.010 -0.021 
 (0.011) (0.030) (0.011) (0.037) (0.011) (0.041) 
pop growth -5.608 17.053 -5.839 11.150 -5.613 11.145 
 (9.242) (13.241) (6.967) (8.134) (6.082) (9.122) 
log population, 
lagged 
0.223 0.061 0.224 -0.003 0.224 -0.004 
 (0.088)** (0.157) (0.079)*** (0.154) (0.066)*** (0.189) 
log gdp/capita, 
lagged 
-0.472 -0.645 -0.373 -0.628 -0.373 -0.627 
 (0.188)** (0.376)* (0.171)** (0.484) (0.219)* (0.505) 
oil 0.653 0.511 0.579 0.345 0.580 0.347 
 (0.352)* (0.566) (0.276)** (0.674) (0.307)* (0.756) 
ethnic 
fractionalization 
1.038 0.182 0.829 0.365 0.827 0.367 
 (0.592)* (0.673) (0.495)* (0.721) (0.484)* (0.741) 
mountainous 
terrain 
0.040 0.202 0.070 0.230 0.071 0.232 
 (0.085) (0.141) (0.100) (0.145) (0.083) (0.164) 
GDP_initial -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
North Africa 0.341  0.489  0.492  
 (0.628)  (0.681)  (0.700)  
Sub Saharan 
Africa 
-0.529  -0.097  -0.096  
 (0.638)  (0.646)  (0.641)  
East Asia -0.512  -0.316  -0.316  
 (0.441)  (0.602)  (0.587)  
West Asia -0.036  0.290  0.292  
 (0.524)  (0.554)  (0.683)  
Middle East 0.089  0.415  0.416  
 (0.738)  (0.762)  (0.666)  
Latin America 0.293  0.439  0.444  
 (0.467)  (0.574)  (0.540)  
peace years -0.039 0.059 -0.040 0.040 -0.041 0.041 
 (0.050) (0.115) (0.045) (0.117) (0.051) (0.146) 
peace years^2 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.009) 
peace years^3 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -2.220 -0.844 -3.145 -0.329 -3.162 -0.325 
 (1.828) (3.127) (1.808)* (3.651) (2.039) (3.552) 
Observations 4885 1440 4682 1456 4688 1456 
Log likelihood -498.09 -194.55 -496.00 -197.81 -496.09 -197.81 
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05 
(Bootstrapped) standard errors in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
 
Tables A.I and A.II show the robustness check of our results for different indicators of 
climate change and different data sources. The coefficients shown in columns (1) to (4) rely 
on climate change as defined by Miguel; columns (1) and (2) are based on the GPCC data and 
columns (3) and (4) rely on the CRU data. Columns (5) and (6) replicate the results for a 
moving average, this time based on the CRU data rather than on the GPCC data as in the main 
text. 
 
Table A.III. Climate change and economic growth, bottom billion 
 
 (1) (2) 
 bottom billion growth, SPI bottom billion growth, gpcc_ma 
SPI -1.401  
 (1.024)  
temperature ma30  -0.320 
  (0.622) 
precipitation ma30  0.003 
  (0.002) 
xpolity, lagged 0.054 0.072 
 (0.081) (0.083) 
pop growth 17.873 29.039 
 (22.799) (33.925) 
log population, lagged -0.772 -0.524 
 (0.845) (1.136) 
log gdp/capita, lagged -8.099 -8.079 
 (1.664)*** (2.315)*** 
oil 0.931 0.411 
 (1.420) (1.507) 
ethnic fractionalization -1.197 -1.502 
 (1.496) (2.021) 
mountainous terrain -0.291 -0.453 
 (0.155)* (0.141)*** 
GDP initial  0.004 0.004 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
η 0.973 0.983 
 (0.110)*** (0.112)*** 
Constant 60.555 58.458 
 (0.807)*** (0.862)*** 
Observations 1512 1382 
R-squared 0.08 0.08 
R2 0.08 0.08 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
 
Table A.IV. Predicted economic growth and conflict, bottom billion 
 
 (1) (2) 
 bottom billion conflict, SPI bottom billion conflict, gpcc_ma 
predicted growth, lagged -0.118 -0.172 
 (0.094) (0.123) 
xpolity, lagged 0.035 0.053 
 (0.051) (0.046) 
polity*growth 0.011 0.004 
 (0.027) (0.034) 
pop growth 11.401 13.492 
 (5.569)** (9.312) 
log population, lagged 0.123 0.127 
 (0.187) (0.201) 
log gdp/capita, lagged -0.989 -1.323 
 (0.446)** (0.540)** 
oil 0.473 0.487 
 (0.735) (0.733) 
ethnic fractionalization 0.052 -0.025 
 (0.676) (0.718) 
mountainous terrain 0.061 0.017 
 (0.168) (0.135) 
GDP initial 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
peace years -0.031 -0.006 
 (0.098) (0.096) 
peace years^2 0.003 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
peace years^3 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 1.416 3.576 
 (3.312) (4.109) 
Observations 1496 1368 
Log likelihood -204.04 -185.95 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
 
Further, tables A.III and A.IV replicate the main analyses for the subsample of “bottom 
billion” countries as defined by Buhaug et al. (2010), relying on the concept of Collier (2007).  
 
Table A.V. Climate change and economic growth – 1000 battle related deaths 
 
 (1) (2) 
 world, gpcc_ma africa, gpcc ma 
temperature ma30 -0.203 -0.856 
 (0.189) (0.475)* 
precipitation ma30 0.000 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
xpolity, lagged -0.036 0.008 
 (0.033) (0.076) 
pop growth 15.965 48.524 
 (15.011) (53.879) 
log population, lagged -4.613 -4.933 
 (0.690)*** (3.317) 
log gdp/capita, lagged -5.417 -5.579 
 (0.960)*** (1.967)*** 
trend 0.158 0.146 
 (0.029)*** (0.103) 
oil 2.925 4.845 
 (0.574)*** (0.391)*** 
ethnic fractionalization -2.237 -2.093 
 (0.606)*** (1.313) 
mountainous terrain 0.265 1.471 
 (0.065)*** (0.105)*** 
GDP_initial 0.000 0.002 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
North Africa -5.570  
 (0.182)***  
Sub Saharan Africa -14.109  
 (0.429)***  
East Asia -2.165  
 (0.151)***  
West Asia -5.247  
 (0.185)***  
Middle East -9.662  
 (0.333)***  
Latin America -8.526  
 (0.125)***  
North America 10.763  
 (0.185)***  
η 0.986 0.959 
 (0.018)*** (0.051)*** 
Constant 90.542 76.499 
 (0.204)*** (0.498)*** 
Observations 5074 1464 
R2 0.11 0.10 
Standard errors in parentheses;  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table A.VI. Predicted economic growth and civil conflict – 1000 battle related deaths 
 
 (1) (2) 
 world conflict, gpcc_ma africa conflict, gpcc_ma 
predicted growth, lagged -0.188 -0.148 
 (0.063)*** (0.093) 
xpolity, lagged -0.054 0.066 
 (0.054) (0.063) 
polity*growth 0.024 -0.013 
 (0.015) (0.026) 
pop growth -7.317 17.121 
 (11.300) (10.594) 
log population, lagged 0.239 0.066 
 (0.095)** (0.129) 
log gdp/capita, lagged -0.722 -0.587 
 (0.251)*** (0.506) 
oil 0.591 0.482 
 (0.656) (0.690) 
ethnic fractionalization 1.135 0.256 
 (0.745) (0.608) 
mountainous terrain 0.132 0.203 
 (0.166) (0.183) 
GDP_initial -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
North Africa -0.212  
 (2.387)  
Sub Saharan Africa -1.290  
 (2.296)  
East Asia -0.209  
 (2.171)  
West Asia -0.361  
 (2.283)  
Middle East 0.471  
 (2.266)  
Latin America 0.665  
 (2.128)  
peace years -0.074 0.055 
 (0.077) (0.127) 
peace years^2 0.006 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.008) 
peace years^3 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.972 -1.297 
 (2.774) (3.736) 
Observations 4902 1450 
Log likelihood -282.02 -195.01 
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.04 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Tables A.V and A.VI provide the results if we replace the conflict onset indicator with the 
measurement that relies on a total of 1000 instead of battle related deaths. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table A.VII. Descriptive statistics, world 
 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
       
overall 2.017 7.520 -63.319 151.065 N =    6275 
between  1.988   n =     171 
Economic growth 
within  7.301   T = 36.700 
       
overall .0217 .146 0 1 N =    8568 
between  .031   n =     191 
Civil conflict 
within  .143   T-bar = 44.859 
       
overall .076 .265 0 1 N =    8568 
between  .078   n =     191 
SPI 
within  .255   T-bar = 44.8586 
       
overall .186 .592 -3.979 4.557 N =    7084 
between  .194   n =     163 
Temperature 
ma30 GPCC 
within  .566   T-bar = 43.4601 
       
overall -17.715 188.597 -1310.04 3728.213 N =    7333 
between  50.755   n =     166 
Precipitation 
ma30 GPCC 
within  182.962   T-bar = 44.1747 
       
overall .101 .484 -2.26 2.273 N =    6884 
between  .109   n =     179 
Temperature 
ma30 CRU 
within  .474   T = 38.4581 
       
overall -9.108 178.984 -1247.274 1523.063 N =    6884 
between  45.025   n =     179 
Precipitation 
ma30 CRU 
within  175.651   T = 38.4581 
       
overall .002 .590 -20 35 N =    6878 
between  .073   n =     162 
Temperature 
Miguel GPCC 
within  .585   T = 42.4568 
       
overall .032 .294 -.932 4.2 N =    7168 
between  .063   n =     165 
Precipitation 
Miguel GPCC 
within  .288   T = 43.4424 
       
overall .009 .421 -13 20 N =    6881 
between  .060   n =     179 
Temperature 
Miguel CRU 
within  .415   T = 38.441 
       
overall .024 .247 -.838 3.323 N =    6884 
between  .050   n =     179 
Precipitation 
Miguel CRU 
within  .243   T = 38.458 
       
overall .857 4.922 -6 7 N =    7179 
between  4.122   n =     155 
xpolity, lagged  
within  2.768   T-bar = 46.316 
       
overall .0186 .026 -.563 1.050 N =    7346 
between  .013   n =     183 
pop growth 
within  .023   T-bar = 40.142 
       
overall 8.682 1.898 2.812 14.074 N =    7529 
between  2.062   n =     183 
log population, 
lagged 
within  .312   T-bar = 41.142 
       
overall 8.252 1.119 5.139 11.343 N =    7525 
between  1.065   n =     183 
log gdp/capita, 
lagged 
within  .367   T-bar = 41.120 
       
overall .134 .341 0 1 N =    7449 
between  .316   n =     150 
oil 
within  .153   T-bar =   49.66 
       
overall .385 .281 .001 .925 N =    7449 
between  .274   n =     150 
ethnic 
fractionalization 
within  .020   T-bar =   49.66 
       
overall 2.136 1.424 0 4.557 N =    7449 
between  1.451   n =     150 
mountainous 
terrain 
within  .031   T-bar =   49.66 
       
overall 4328.217 7559.614 233.01 72213.92 N =    8049 
between  8164.048   n =     183 
GDP initial 
within  0   T-bar = 43.984 
       
overall .038 .190 0 1 N =    8568 
between  .175   n =     191 
North Africa 
within  0   T-bar = 44.859 
       
overall .220 .414 0 1 N =    8568 
between  .419   n =     191 
Sub Saharan 
Africa 
within  0   T-bar = 44.859 
       
overall .127 .333 0 1 N =    8568 
between  .326   n =     191 
East Asia 
within  0   T-bar = 44.859 
       
overall .059 .236 0 1 N =    8568 
between  .253   n =     191 
West Asia 
within  0   T-bar = 44.859 
       
overall .084 .277 0 1 N =    8568 
between  .261   n =     191 
Middle East 
within  0   T-bar = 44.859 
       
overall .184 .387 0 1 N =    8568 
between  .370   n =     191 
Latin America 
within  0   T-bar = 44.859 
       
overall .015 .120 0 1 N =    8568 
between  .102   n =     191 
North America 
within  0   T-bar = 44.859 
       
overall 26.713 17.099 1 63 N =    8568 
between  9.237   n =     191 
trend 
within  15.647   T-bar = 44.859 
 
Table A.VIII. Descriptive statistics, Africa 
 
 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
       
overall 1.414 9.863 -63.319 151.065 N =    1930 
between  2.170   n =      56 
Economic growth 
within  9.674   T = 34.464 
       
overall .032 .175 0 1 N =    2365 
between  .031   n =      59 
Civil conflict 
within  .173   T = 40.085 
       
overall .077 .266 0 1 N =    2365 
between  .063   n =      59 
SPI 
within  .259   T = 40.085 
       
overall .128 .517 -2.433 1.981 N =    2116 
between  .144   n =      57 
Temperature 
ma30 GPCC 
within  .496   T = 37.123 
       
overall -25.288 128.695 -707.317 918.371 N =    2198 
between  32.005   n =      59 
Precipitation 
ma30 GPCC 
within  124.530   T = 37.254 
       
overall .129 .435 -1.825 1.686 N =    2283 
between  .098   n =      58 
Temperature 
ma30 CRU 
within  .425   T = 39.362 
       
overall -20.243 128.914 -867.013 1301.607 N =    2283 
between  28.686   n =      58 
Precipitation 
ma30 CRU 
within  125.843   T = 39.362 
       
overall .001 .027 -.142 .113 N =    2110 
between  .001   n =      57 
Temperature 
Miguel GPCC 
within  .027   T = 37.018 
       
overall .0520 .391 -.932 4.2 N =    2197 
between  .096   n =      59 
Precipitation 
Miguel GPCC 
within  .382   T = 37.237 
       
overall .001 .026 -.197 .176 N =    2283 
between  .001   n =      58 
Temperature 
Miguel CRU 
within  .026   T = 39.362 
       
overall .037 .306 -.838 3.021 N =    2283 
between  .063   n =      58 
Precipitation 
Miguel CRU 
within  .301   T = 39.362 
       
overall -1.676 4.042 -6 7 N =    2280 
between  3.341   n =      59 
xpolity, lagged  
within  2.217   T = 38.644 
       
overall .028 .027 -.555 .486 N =    2247 
between  .011   n =      59 
pop growth 
within  .026   T = 38.085 
       
overall 8.556 1.279 5.418 11.699 N =    2306 
between  1.237   n =      59 
log population, 
lagged 
within  .355   T = 39.085 
       
overall 7.671 1.089 5.139 11.081 N =    2247 
between  1.081   n =      59 
log gdp/capita, 
lagged 
within  .300   T = 38.085 
       
overall .242 .429 0 1 N =    2365 
between  .379   n =      59 
oil 
within  .192   T = 40.085 
       
overall .486 .296 .036 .925 N =    2365 
between  .289   n =      59 
ethnic 
fractionalization 
within  .001   T = 40.085 
       
overall 1.802 1.453 0 4.421 N =    2365 
between  1.451   n =      59 
mountainous 
terrain 
within  0   T = 40.085 
       
overall 3370.897 8442.823 330.67 64913.51 N =    2306 
between  8554.005   n =      59 
GDP initial 
within  0   T = 39.085 
       
overall 21.906 13.441 1 55 N =    2365 
between  5.272   n =      59 
trend 





Table A.IX. Binary correlations, World 
 
  growth  conflict  SPI  temp_ma_30_GPCC  preci_ma_30_GPCC  temp_ma30_CRU  preci_ma 30_CRU  temp_miguel_GPCC  preci_miguel_GPCC  temp_miguel_CRU  preci_miguel_CRU  xpolity, lagged  pop growth  log popu‐lation, lagged growth  1.00                                                        conflict  ‐0.03  1.00                           (0.04)                           SPI  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  1.00                         (0.15)  (0.25)                         temp_ma_30_ GPCC  ‐0.01  ‐0.02  0.00  1.00                       (0.27)  (0.05)  (0.76)                       preci_ma_30_ GPCC  0.02  ‐0.01  ‐0.03  ‐0.06  1.00                     (0.19)  (0.36)  (0.02)  (0.00)                     temp_ma30_CRU  ‐0.04  ‐0.00  0.02  0.80  ‐0.04  1.00                   (0.01)  (0.91)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.00)                   preci_ma30_CRU  0.03  ‐0.01  ‐0.02  ‐0.07  0.69  ‐0.08  1.00                 (0.02)  (0.21)  (0.09)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)                 temp_miguel_ GPCC  ‐0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  ‐0.00  0.05  ‐0.00  1.00               (0.32)  (0.98)  (0.51)  (0.78)  (0.85)  (0.00)  (0.83)               preci_miguel_ GPCC  0.04  ‐0.01  ‐0.00  ‐0.05  0.42  ‐0.05  0.32  ‐0.00  1.00             (0.00)  (0.33)  (0.78)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.84)             temp_miguel_ CRU  0.01  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  0.07  0.01  0.08  0.01  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  1.00           (0.52)  (0.74)  (0.79)  (0.00)  (0.58)  (0.00)  (0.55)  (0.11)  (0.62)           preci_miguel_ CRU  0.05  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.07  0.36  ‐0.07  0.47  ‐0.00  0.72  ‐0.00  1.00         (0.00)  (0.57)  (0.54)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.79)  (0.00)  (0.89)         xpolity, lagged  0.04  ‐0.02  0.00  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.01  ‐0.04  0.03  ‐0.03  1.00       (0.01)  (0.05)  (1.00)  (0.00)  (0.28)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.27)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.02)       pop growth  ‐0.04  0.01  ‐0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  ‐0.00  0.02  ‐0.02  0.03  ‐0.22  1.00     (0.00)  (0.45)  (0.93)  (0.64)  (0.55)  (0.14)  (0.39)  (0.81)  (0.21)  (0.16)  (0.01)  (0.00)     log population, lagged  ‐0.01  0.07  ‐0.00  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.04  0.02  ‐0.05  0.00  ‐0.04  0.11  ‐0.02  1.00 
  (0.67)  (0.00)  (1.00)  (0.12)  (0.02)  (0.90)  (0.00)  (0.09)  (0.00)  (0.90)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.12)   log GDP/capita, lagged  0.01  ‐0.08  ‐0.01  0.06  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.01  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.42  ‐0.14  ‐0.14   (0.25)  (0.00)  (0.34)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.30)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) oil  ‐0.01  0.03  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.06  ‐0.00  0.04  ‐0.23  0.11  ‐0.04   (0.34)  (0.00)  (0.56)  (0.36)  (0.41)  (0.00)  (0.19)  (0.10)  (0.00)  (0.93)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) ethnic fractionalization  ‐0.07  0.07  0.05  0.04  ‐0.06  0.01  ‐0.06  ‐0.00  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.02  ‐0.13  0.08  0.04   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.34)  (0.00)  (0.93)  (0.01)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) mountainous terrain  0.01  0.04  ‐0.00  ‐0.01  0.03  ‐0.01  0.02  0.00  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.03  ‐0.05  ‐0.00  0.28   (0.66)  (0.00)  (0.85)  (0.48)  (0.03)  (0.63)  (0.12)  (0.71)  (0.03)  (0.11)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.96)  (0.00) GDP initial  ‐0.04  ‐0.04  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.07  0.01  0.10  0.01  0.07  ‐0.23   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.74)  (0.29)  (0.04)  (0.24)  (0.17)  (0.72)  (0.00)  (0.35)  (0.00)  (0.56)  (0.00)  (0.00) North Africa  0.01  0.01  ‐0.01  0.04  0.00  0.04  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  0.03  ‐0.00  0.00  ‐0.18  0.05  0.08   (0.69)  (0.24)  (0.35)  (0.00)  (0.72)  (0.00)  (0.88)  (0.99)  (0.01)  (0.77)  (0.81)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) Sub Saharan Africa  ‐0.07  0.02  0.05  ‐0.01  ‐0.08  0.03  ‐0.06  ‐0.00  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.21  0.13  ‐0.12   (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.62)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.93)  (0.09)  (0.39)  (0.40)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) East Asia  0.04  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.02  ‐0.02  ‐0.02  ‐0.02  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  0.02  0.03  0.17   (0.00)  (0.33)  (0.00)  (0.29)  (0.01)  (0.14)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.09)  (0.14)  (0.00)  (0.00) West Asia  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.08  0.00  ‐0.00  0.01  0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.03  0.01  0.15   (0.66)  (0.00)  (0.35)  (0.00)  (0.80)  (0.71)  (0.46)  (0.90)  (0.60)  (0.94)  (0.53)  (0.01)  (0.24)  (0.00) Middle East  ‐0.01  0.02  ‐0.03  ‐0.04  0.02  0.02  0.01  ‐0.00  0.12  ‐0.01  0.10  ‐0.25  0.20  ‐0.08   (0.45)  (0.15)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.13)  (0.04)  (0.29)  (0.96)  (0.00)  (0.67)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) Latin America  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  0.00  ‐0.05  0.02  ‐0.01  0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  ‐0.02  0.08  ‐0.00  ‐0.16   (0.14)  (0.43)  (0.93)  (0.00)  (0.10)  (0.52)  (0.94)  (0.93)  (0.09)  (0.42)  (0.16)  (0.00)  (0.75)  (0.00) North America  0.00  ‐0.02  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.00  ‐0.01  0.16  ‐0.02  0.16   (0.84)  (0.09)  (0.40)  (0.00)  (0.22)  (0.45)  (0.34)  (0.72)  (0.27)  (1.00)  (0.31)  (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.00) trend  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  0.05  0.21  ‐0.04  0.24  ‐0.01  0.01  ‐0.02  0.00  ‐0.02  0.25  ‐0.09  0.38   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.63)  (0.41)  (0.15)  (0.73)  (0.15)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
 
   lag GDP/capita, lagged  Oil  ethnic fraction‐alization  moun‐tainous terrain  GDP initial  North Africa  Sub Saharan Africa  East Asia  West Asia  Middle East  Latin America  North America  trend log GDP/capita, lagged  1.00                                                    oil  0.15  1.00                         (0.00)                         ethnic fractionalization  ‐0.40  0.03  1.00                       (0.00)  (0.03)                       mountainous terrain  ‐0.15  ‐0.04  ‐0.04  1.00                     (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)                     GDP initial  0.52  0.24  ‐0.18  ‐0.19  1.00                   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)                   North Africa  ‐0.03  0.18  ‐0.03  ‐0.01  ‐0.03  1.00                 (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.26)  (0.00)                 Sub Saharan Africa  ‐0.49  ‐0.07  0.49  ‐0.25  ‐0.21  ‐0.10  1.00               (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)               East Asia  ‐0.10  ‐0.10  0.00  0.10  ‐0.06  ‐0.08  ‐0.20  1.00             (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.76)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)             West Asia  ‐0.20  ‐0.05  0.20  0.21  ‐0.09  ‐0.05  ‐0.13  ‐0.10  1.00           (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)           Middle East  0.13  0.41  ‐0.18  ‐0.00  0.32  ‐0.06  ‐0.16  ‐0.12  ‐0.08  1.00         (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.91)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)         Latin America  0.11  ‐0.02  ‐0.20  0.16  ‐0.03  ‐0.09  ‐0.25  ‐0.18  ‐0.12  ‐0.14  1.00       (0.00)  (0.18)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)       North America  0.17  ‐0.05  0.08  0.08  0.10  ‐0.02  ‐0.06  ‐0.05  ‐0.03  ‐0.04  ‐0.06  1.00     (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)     trend  0.24  0.02  ‐0.09  0.08  ‐0.06  0.01  ‐0.10  0.02  ‐0.03  0.02  0.04  0.04  1.00   (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.35)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.00)   
 
Table A.X. Binary correlations, Africa   growth  conflict  SPI  temp_ma_30_GPCC  preci_ma_30_GPCC  temp_ma30_CRU  preci_ma 30_CRU  temp_miguel_GPCC  preci_miguel_GPCC  temp_miguel_CRU  preci_miguel_CRU  xpolity,lagged  pop growth  log popu‐lation, lagged growth  1.00                                                        conflict  ‐0.03  1.00                           (0.04)                           SPI  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  1.00                         (0.15)  (0.25)                         temp_ma_30_ GPCC  ‐0.01  ‐0.02  0.00  1.00                       (0.27)  (0.05)  (0.76)                       preci_ma_30_ GPCC  0.02  ‐0.01  ‐0.03  ‐0.06  1.00                     (0.19)  (0.36)  (0.02)  (0.00)                     temp_ma30_CRU  ‐0.04  ‐0.00  0.02  0.80  ‐0.04  1.00                   (0.01)  (0.91)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.00)                   preci_ma30_CRU  0.03  ‐0.01  ‐0.02  ‐0.07  0.69  ‐0.08  1.00                 (0.02)  (0.21)  (0.09)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)                 temp_miguel_ GPCC  ‐0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  ‐0.00  0.05  ‐0.00  1.00               (0.32)  (0.98)  (0.51)  (0.78)  (0.85)  (0.00)  (0.83)               preci_miguel_ GPCC  0.04  ‐0.01  ‐0.00  ‐0.05  0.42  ‐0.05  0.32  ‐0.00  1.00             (0.00)  (0.33)  (0.78)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.84)             temp_miguel_ CRU  0.01  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  0.07  0.01  0.08  0.01  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  1.00           (0.52)  (0.74)  (0.79)  (0.00)  (0.58)  (0.00)  (0.55)  (0.11)  (0.62)           preci_miguel_ CRU  0.05  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.07  0.36  ‐0.07  0.47  ‐0.00  0.72  ‐0.00  1.00         (0.00)  (0.57)  (0.54)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.79)  (0.00)  (0.89)         xpolity, lagged  0.04  ‐0.02  0.00  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.01  ‐0.04  0.03  ‐0.03  1.00       (0.01)  (0.05)  (1.00)  (0.00)  (0.28)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.27)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.02)       pop growth  ‐0.04  0.01  ‐0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  ‐0.00  0.02  ‐0.02  0.03  ‐0.22  1.00     (0.00)  (0.45)  (0.93)  (0.64)  (0.55)  (0.14)  (0.39)  (0.81)  (0.21)  (0.16)  (0.01)  (0.00)     
log population, lagged  ‐0.01  0.07  ‐0.00  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.04  0.02  ‐0.05  0.00  ‐0.04  0.11  ‐0.02  1.00   (0.67)  (0.00)  (1.00)  (0.12)  (0.02)  (0.90)  (0.00)  (0.09)  (0.00)  (0.90)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.12)   log GDP/capita, lagged  0.01  ‐0.08  ‐0.01  0.06  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.01  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.42  ‐0.14  ‐0.14   (0.25)  (0.00)  (0.34)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.30)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) oil  ‐0.01  0.03  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.06  ‐0.00  0.04  ‐0.23  0.11  ‐0.04   (0.34)  (0.00)  (0.56)  (0.36)  (0.41)  (0.00)  (0.19)  (0.10)  (0.00)  (0.93)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) ethnic fractionalization  ‐0.07  0.07  0.05  0.04  ‐0.06  0.01  ‐0.06  ‐0.00  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.02  ‐0.13  0.08  0.04   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.34)  (0.00)  (0.93)  (0.01)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) mountainous terrain  0.01  0.04  ‐0.00  ‐0.01  0.03  ‐0.01  0.02  0.00  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.03  ‐0.05  ‐0.00  0.28   (0.66)  (0.00)  (0.85)  (0.48)  (0.03)  (0.63)  (0.12)  (0.71)  (0.03)  (0.11)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.96)  (0.00) GDP initial  ‐0.04  ‐0.04  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.07  0.01  0.10  0.01  0.07  ‐0.23   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.74)  (0.29)  (0.04)  (0.24)  (0.17)  (0.72)  (0.00)  (0.35)  (0.00)  (0.56)  (0.00)  (0.00) trend  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  0.05  0.21  ‐0.04  0.24  ‐0.01  0.01  ‐0.02  0.00  ‐0.02  0.25  ‐0.09  0.38   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.63)  (0.41)  (0.15)  (0.73)  (0.15)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
 
   pop growth  log popu‐lation, lagged  log GDP/ capita, lagged  oil  ethnic fraction‐alization  moun‐tainous terrain  GDP_initial  trend pop growth  1.00                                log population  ‐0.07  1.00               (0.00)               log GDP/ capita, lagged  0.17  ‐0.29  1.00             (0.00)  (0.00)             oil  0.13  0.06  0.44  1.00           (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)           ethnic fraction‐alization  ‐0.06  0.22  ‐0.39  ‐0.17  1.00         (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)         mountainous terrain  ‐0.10  0.36  ‐0.13  ‐0.03  ‐0.32  1.00       (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.14)  (0.00)       GDP initial  0.18  ‐0.25  0.55  0.32  ‐0.22  ‐0.19  1.00     (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)     trend  ‐0.02  0.40  0.13  0.12  ‐0.08  0.10  ‐0.02  1.00   (0.28)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.32)   
 
